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The Restatement's Attractive Nuisance Doctrine:
An Attractive Alternative for Ohio
I. INTRODUCTION
Under traditional tort doctrine, the extent of the duty that an owner or occupier
of land owes to an entrant upon the land has depended on the entrant's status as a
trespasser, licensee, or invitee.' The law has required the least duty of care toward
trespassers. The owner or occupier has had to refrain only from willful or wanton
injury to trespassers. 2 An exception to this harsh rule has developed, however, with
respect to child trespassers. This special duty is known as the attractive nuisance
doctrine3 and has been adopted in some form by the vast majority of American
jurisdictions, most of which have adopted the Second Restatement of Torts section
3394 version of the special rule.5
Ohio, however, has steadfastly refused to adopt any version of the attractive
nuisance doctrine. In Ohio, a trespassing child is afforded no greater protection than
that afforded a trespassing adult. 6 This outdated and harsh position fails to take into
account the societal value of protecting children from serious injury.
Ohio's current position is based upon Railroad Co. v. Harvey,7 a decision
handed down over seventy-five years ago. Since the Harvey decision, a vast majority
of jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement Rule in an effort to balance equitably
the interests of landowners with those of children who may not appreciate the gravity
of danger they are likely to encounter on the land.
Although the Ohio court has continually rejected any form of the attractive
nuisance doctrine, it has reevaluated outdated concepts in other areas of tort law.
Justice Sweeney, writing for a 6-1 majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio in the
recent decision of Paugh v. Hanks,8 emphasized the court's desire to establish new
standards in the area of tort law to reflect corresponding changes in modem society.9
In Paugh, the court reaffirmed its bold recognition of a cause of action for the
negligent infliction of serious emotional distress even when there has been no physi-
cal contact with the plaintiff nor physical manifestation of injury. 1 This decision
© Copyright 1985 by David A. Gurwin.
1. W. PROSsER & W. KEErON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 58 (5th ed. 1984).
2. See, e.g., Cole v. New York Cent. R.R., 150 Ohio St. 175, 80 N.E.2d 854 (1948).
3. W. PRossER & W. KEurON, supra note 1, § 59.
4. RESTArEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965) [hereinafter referred to in text and notes as the Restatement
Rule or Rule).
5. See infra note 46.
6. See, e.g., Sharp Realty Co. v. Forsha, 122 Ohio St. 368, 171 N.E. 598 (1930).
7. 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
8. 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983). The court in Paugh was explaining its earlier opinion in the case of
Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131,447 N.E.2d 109 (1983), in which the court eliminated the requirement
of physical manifestation of injury or physical contact as a prerequisite for bringing an action for negligent infliction of
serious emotional distress.
9. 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 74, 451 N.E.2d 759, 762 (1983).
10. See Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
places Ohio among the most progressive American jurisdictions with regard to the
recognition of that particular tort cause of action.
Another major step was taken by the same court just three weeks after the Paugh
decision. In Anderson v. Ceccardi1 the court eliminated the longstanding distinction
between contributory negligence and assumption of risk. It held that assumption of
risk would no longer act as a complete bar to recovery, but would be apportioned
along with any contributory negligence in light of the Ohio comparative negligence
statute. 12
The purpose of this Comment is to encourage the Supreme Court of Ohio to
reevaluate its harsh and outdated view of the duty owed to trespassing children,
specifically where highly dangerous conditions on the land pose a threat to their
safety. The Ohio courts have continued to rely on Harvey13 as the basis for denying
recovery to injured minor trespassers. Although the underlying rationale of Harvey
was the subject of considerable criticism after the Supreme Court of Ohio handed
down the decision,' 4 it has not been reevaluated in light of the many changes that
have occurred in American society since that time.
This Comment will demonstrate that the Restatement Rule would provide a
workable standard for the Ohio courts to apply. 15 It is a much more flexible approach
than the earlier version of the attractive nuisance doctrine rejected in Harvey. The
Restatement Rule is based on foreseeability and will not unduly burden landowners.
Rather, ordinary negligence standards are embodied in the Restatement Rule and,
more importantly, it reflects the important value of protecting children who are
unable to protect themselves.
If the Supreme Court of Ohio truly desires to be in the forefront of American tort
law it should, at the very least, reevaluate its past position and examine the merits of
the Restatement Rule. This Comment will outline the development of the Restate-
ment Rule and explain its components. Also, it will trace the law in Ohio and the split
that has developed between it and the other jurisdictions in the United States. Finally,
this Comment will show that the adoption of a slightly modified version of the
Restatement Rule would be beneficial for Ohio.
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
The Restatement's attractive nuisance doctrine, which this Comment proposes
Ohio adopt, differs from the original common law attractive nuisance doctrine. That
doctrine was based on the concept of allurement, 1 6 a basis that both the original
Restatement and the Second Restatement have since rejected.17 Nonetheless, an
11. 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).
12. Id. at 113, 451 N.E. 2d at 783; see OHiO REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1982).
13. Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
14. See, e.g., Ziehm v. Vale, 98 Ohio St. 306, 120 N.E. 702 (1918) (Wanamaker, J., concurring).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 31-37.
16. The "allurement" rationale, which was based on the judicial fiction of the child's enticement to the dangerous
object, was first espoused by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207
(1875).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 31-44.
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examination of the doctrine as it originally developed is useful. It is important to note
that the original doctrine was adopted by a vast majority of the jurisdictions in the
United States and rejected by a few, including Ohio.18 Equally significant is the fact
that the vast majority of jurisdictions that followed the traditional doctrine as it
originally developed, as well as several jurisdictions that flatly rejected the original
statement of the doctrine, have accepted the modified Restatement view, Second
Restatement section 339.19
Traditionally, coUrts have distinguished the duties owed to an entrant upon one's
land on the basis of the entrant's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. 20 Under
the traditional rule a trespasser, defined as "a person who enters or remains upon land
in the possession of another without a privilege to do so, created by the possessor's
consent or otherwise," 2  has been afforded only a limited amount of protection. The
owner or occupier of the land has only owed a trespasser the duty not to inflict harm
willfully or wantonly nor trap the entrant once his presence has become known. 2
An exception to this rule with respect to trespassing children was first enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad v. Stout.23 In
18. Hannon v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921); Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E.
66 (1907).
19. See infra note 46.
20. W. PRossER & W. K. roN, supra note 1, § 58. But see Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,443 P.2d 561,70
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). In Rowland, the California Supreme Court discarded the categories of trespasser, licensee, and
invitee as they relate to landowner liability. Instead, the court established the single landowner duty of ordinary care and
management of property, and the duty to conduct oneself as a reasonable person would in view of the probability of injury
to others. Id. The court indicated, however, that the plaintiff's status as trespasser, licensee, or invitee may, in light of the
facts giving rise to such status, have some bearing on the question of liability. Id. Nonetheless, the status itself is no longer
determinative of liability in California and in most states that have adopted the Rowland view. It should be noted also,
however, that not all of those states which have adopted Rowland have included trespassers within the new rule. See infra
note 102. Notwithstanding these exceptions, pure application of Rowland encompasses trespassers.
The Supreme Court of Ohio in DiGildo v. Caponi, 18 Ohio St. 2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969), mentioned the
Rowland approach in a case that involved injury to an infant social guest, but decided the case on other grounds. The
court, however, did not explicitly reject the Rowland approach. Rather, it deferred the question until a later date. Id. at
131, 247 N.E.2d at 736. As of this writing, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not ruled on this issue.
This Comment focuses on the current need for increased protection of child trespassers who are unaware of
dangerous conditions upon land. Adoption of the Restatement Rule would sufficiently address this problem. While the
Rowland v. Christian approach, when applied to encompass a duty to trespassers, see infra note 102, would remedy this
problem, its effects would be much farther reaching than those of the Restatement Rule. Indeed, while Rowland offers a
meritorious approach to premises liability law, the approach would be a drastic change in Ohio law. Although one effect
of that rule would be the protection of children in attractive nuisance types of situations, it would also extend a similar duty
even to adult trespassers.
The Restatement Rule proposed herein would allow the Supreme Court of Ohio to avoid drastically changing
premises liability laws relating to all classes of entrants, while allowing increased protection to child trespassers. For this
reason, this Comment only suggests the adoption of the Restatement Rule approach, and does not address the merits of the
Rowland v. Christian approach. For a more detailed analysis of Rowland v. Christian, see Case Comment, Duty of
Reasonable Care to Third Persons on the Premises, 26 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 128 (1969). For an extensive survey of the
current state of the Rowland v. Christian doctrine, see Hawkins, Premises Liability After Repudiation of the Status
Categories: Allocation of Judge and Jury Function, 1981 UTAH L. Rav. 15; see also Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H.
552, 558-59, 364 A.2d 631, 635 (1976) (Duncan, J. concurring), where the adoption of the Rowland approach in New
Hampshire was criticized. Justice Duncan stated that the court should have based its decision on the Restatement Rule
rather than abandon the traditional distinctions between trespassers, licensees, and invitees.
There is too much of value in the restatement of the law with respect to trespassing children [Restatement
(Second) of Torts §339 (1965)], and owners of land in general to warrant its abandonment particularly in
instructing juries. [citations omitted]. The considerations set forth in the Restatement [Rule] must be imparted to
the jury if it is to be placed in a position to decide whether reasonable care was exercised by the landowner.
Id.
21. W. PRossER & W. Kaerio, supra note 1, § 58.
22. Id. at 397.
23. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
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Stout a trespassing child was injured while playing with a railroad turntable. For this
reason the doctrine originally was known as the "turntable doctrine. -24 Under this
doctrine, an owner or occupier of land was liable for injuries to trespassing children
caused by conditions or objects on the premises if the occupier knew or should have
known that the condition or object was in a place where children were likely to
trespass, and the occupier failed to exercise reasonable care to protect against the
threatened injury.25 The Stout decision was based on the foreseeability of injury to a
minor, rather than the minor's status as either trespasser, licensee, or invitee. The
Stout rationale remains the basis of most actions of this type today.26
Two years after Stout was decided the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Keffe v.
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.,27 first used the terminology "attractive nui-
sance" and enunciated a modified theory based on allurement or attraction. The
theory was based on the judicial fiction that the enticement (i.e., the turntable or other
similarly hazardous condition that attracted the young child) substituted for an invita-
tion and imposed upon the landowner the duties and obligations owed to an invitee.28
The United States Supreme Court adopted this "implied invitation" version of the
doctrine in 1922 in United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt,29 stating: "[I]t may be held
that knowingly to establish and expose, unfenced, to children of an age when they
follow a bait as mechanically as a fish, something that is certain to attract them, has
the legal effect of an invitation to them although not to an adult.' '30
III. THE RESTATEMENT'S REJECTION OF THE ALLUREMENT
REQUIREMENT: SECTION 339
In 1934, the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) promulgated the Restatement of
Torts.3 1 In an effort to avoid the judicial fiction of the attractive nuisance doctrine that
originated in Keffe, the A.L.I. in section 339 of the Restatement 32 devised a rule
which forthrightly recognized the child's status as a trespasser, but nevertheless
imposed a carefully limited duty of reasonable care upon the landowner toward the
child. That section of the Restatement, entitled "Artificial Conditions Highly
Dangerous to Trespassing Children," grew out of widespread resistance to the allure-
ment theory upon which Keffe had been based. It has been adopted by the vast
majority of American jurisdictions. 33 Thus, the term "attractive nuisance" came to
be and remains a misnomer. For this reason, this Comment will refer to the Restate-
ment approach simply as the Restatement Rule. The Restatement Rule replaced the
allurement theory with a rationale based on foreseeability.3 4
24. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 59.
25. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
26. J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 12.02 (1982).
27. 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
28. Id. at 211.
29. 258 U.S. 268 (1922). TheBrit case was implicitly overruled 12 years later, after it had been the subject of much
criticism, in Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411 (1934).
30. 258 U.S. 268, 275 (1922).
31. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (1934).
32. Id. § 339.
33. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 59.
34. Id.
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Dean Prosser stated that under the Restatement's approach, trespassing children
should be treated under the general principles of negligence and "the fact the child
[is] a trespasser is merely one fact to be taken into account, with others, in determin-
ing the defendant's duty, and the care required of him." 35 Whereas the "allurement"
rule often led to results not truly based on foreseeability, but rather on legal fiction,
and accordingly was criticized by several jurisdictions including Ohio, 36 the Restate-
ment Rule was drafted to balance the rights of trespassing minors who were injured
with the rights of the landowner who had created a dangerous artificial condition.
37
This section of the Restatement was modified slightly38 in 1965 in the Second
Restatement of Torts section 339, which states:
Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm39 to children4° trespassing
thereon caused by an artificial condition4' upon the land42 if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has
reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and
which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk
involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of
eliminating the danger4 3 are slight as compared with the risk to children involved,, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise
to protect the children.44
This section provides that a possessor of land is subject to liability for physical
harm to trespassing children as a result of an artificial condition45 upon the land,
provided that the five elements are met. The Restatement Rule is now accepted by the
35. Id.
36. Hannon v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921); Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E.
66 (1907).
37. Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948).
38. The modifications in the REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 were largely a result of Dean Prosser's article
Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 427 (1959).
39. In the original Restatement rule, the phrase was "bodily harm." This is a wider rule than that encompassed by
the first Restatement. See Prosser, supra note 38.
40. In the original Restatement rule, the phrase was "young children." REsTATrmEtNT OF TORrs § 339 (1934). See
infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
41. In the original Restatement rule, the phrase was "structure or other artificial condition." REsTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 339 (1934).
42. In the original Restatement rule, the phrase was "which he maintains upon the land." Id.
43. The original Restatement rule did not contain the phrase "the burden of eliminating the danger." Id. § 339(d).
44. Clause (e) was not a part of the original Restatement rule. Id. § 339.
45. The Restatement Rule does not apply to activities upon the land, but instead is limited to artificial conditions
present upon the land. Children receive no greater protection than adults in carrying out activities on the land unless the
children fall within one of the other exceptions to the general rule of nonliability towards any trespasser. Those exceptions
include those in RESTATiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 334 (1965) (Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Constant
Trespassers on Limited Area) and id. § 336 (Activities Dangerous to Known Trespassers).
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great majority of American courts, 4 6 some of which had not previously recognized
the attractive nuisance doctrine.47
The official comments to the Restatement Rule help to explain the reason for the
Rule's widespread acceptance.
It is now recognized by most Uurisdictions] that the basis of the rule is ... the ordinary
negligence basis of a duty of reasonable care not to inflict foreseeable harm on another,
and that the fact that the child is a trespasser is merely one of the facts to be taken into
consideration. The result is a limited obligation to the child, falling short of a duty to
prevent all foreseeable harm to him, but requiring reasonable care as to those conditions
against which he may be expected to be unable to protect himself.
48
The Restatement Rule as stated applies only to artificial conditions or structures.
It specifically states that the A.L.I. expresses no position whether the Rule applies to
natural conditions or conditions closely approximating nature. 49 The reason for this
caveat was the diversity of judicial opinion on the subject.50 For example, there are a
few decisions, including ones involving natural waters,5 1 a rock cliff in a park,5 z and
a gully near a street,53 which have held that the doctrine does not apply to natural
conditions. Additionally, in many cases concerning artificial ponds and other artifi-
cial conditions, liability has been denied because the conditions duplicate nature.
54
Dean Prosser, the Reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts, noted that the
true reason for denying recovery in the case of a natural condition was not simply
because the condition was a natural one, but rather because these conditions were
ones which the child would usually be able to understand and appreciate. 55 Thus,
even if the Restatement explicitly applied to natural conditions, recovery would not
necessarily follow in a case involving a natural condition, because the requirement of
section 339(c) 56 would not have been met. Prosser concluded that the caveat regard-
46. The following jurisdictions have adopted in some form the Restatement of Torts § 339 or Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 339: Taylor v. Alaska Rivers Nay. Co., 391 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1964); MacNeil v. Perkins, 84 Ariz. 74, 324 P.2d
211 (1958); Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 193 A. 608 (1937); Beaston v. James Julian, Inc., 49 Del. 521, 120 A.2d
317 (1956); Cockerham v. R.E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1955); Wagner v. Kepler, 411 11. 368, 104 N.E.2d
231 (1951); Brittain v. Cubbon, 190 Kan. 641, 378 P.2d 141 (1963); Kentucky & Indiana Terminal R. v. Mann, 312
S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1958); Jones v. Billings, 289 A.2d 39 (Me. 1972); Slinker v. Wallner, 258 Minn. 243, 103 N.W.2d 377
(1960); Nichols v. Consolidated Dairies of Lake County, 125 Mont. 460, 239 P.2d 740 (1952); Arbogast v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 452 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. 1970) (the Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1, refusing to follow
Thieret v. Hoel, 412 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. 1967) decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2. That decision
had rejected the doctrine.); Saul v. Roman Catholic Church of Santa Fe, 75 N.M. 160, 402 P.2d 48 (1965); Dean v.
Wilson Constr. Co., 251 N.C. 581, 111 S.E.2d 827 (1960) (To invoke the attractive nuisance doctrine, "the facts [must
be] such as to impose the duty of anticipation or prevision." [Citations omitted)); Mikkelson v. Risovi, 141 N.W.2d 150
(N.D. 1966); Pocholec v. Giustina, 224 Or. 245, 355 P.2d 1104 (1960); Jesko v. Turk, 421 Pa. 434, 219 A.2d 591
(1966); Morris v. City of Britton, 66 S.D. 121, 279 N.W. 531 (1938); Massie v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 319, 233 S.W.2d
449 (1950); Davis v. Provo City Corp., I Utah 2d 244, 265 P.2d 415 (1953); Massino v. Smaglick, 3 Wis. 2d 607, 89
N.W.2d 223 (1958); Afton Elec. Co. v. Harrison, 49 Wyo. 367, 54 P.2d 540 (1936).
47. See infra note 112.
48. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339 comment b (1965).
49. Id. § 339 comment p (1965). For an excellent discussion of this caveat see Prosser, supra note 38, § 2.2(e).
50. Prosser, supra note 38.
51. Gandy v. Copeland, 204 Ala. 366, 86 So. 3 (1920) (spring); Fitch v. Selwyn Village, 234 N.C. 632, 68 S.E.2d
255 (1951) (stream).
52. Bagby v. Kansas City, 338 Mo. 771, 92 S.W.2d 142 (1936).
53. McComb City v. Hayman, 124 Miss. 525, 87 So. 11 (1920).
54. Prosser, supra note 38, at 446.
55. Id.
56. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339(c) (1965).
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ing natural conditions in section 339 was added because the case of the natural
condition that the child would not appreciate had not yet arisen. 57 Should that case
arise, this Comment proposes that the Restatement guidelines, if strictly applied,
should also encompass purely natural conditions. There is no compelling justification
to deny recovery solely because of the origin of the condition.
Although other jurisdictions may have limited the Restatement Rule to artificial
conditions, that position is unduly restrictive. Because the Restatement Rule is a rule
of foreseeability, landowners will be liable only for foreseeable injuries caused by a
natural condition, the danger of which the landowner could expect a child to be
unaware. To impose liability under the Rule it must be established also that the utility
of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the risk of danger are
slight compared with the danger. Even assuming that both are substantially out-
weighed by the risk of danger to those trespassing children,5 8 the owner of the land
will still not have to take drastic means to protect them. Rather, he will simply be
subject to the reasonable care requirement of the Restatement Rule,59 which is not
unduly burdensome. "The basis of liability is the foreseeability of harm, and the
measure of duty is care in proportion to the foreseeable risk.''
6 °
A. The Elements of the Restatement Rule
The Restatement Rule contains flexible language. This flexibility is useful be-
cause it gives triers of fact greater leeway in deciding premises liability cases, and
avoids the problem of per se denial of recovery (and per se imposition of liability) by
allowing the trier of fact to analyze the facts of each case thoroughly.
Various jurisdictions have interpreted the Rule in many different ways as a result
of the Rule's flexibility. 6 ' Because the Restatement is not statutory in nature, but
rather a model approach, no specific interpretation of the Rule is compelled. There-
fore, Ohio should not limit its application of the Rule to certain enumerated factual
situations as such a limitation would destroy one of the great attributes of the Restate-
ment Rule-its inherent flexibility. Indeed, this Comment does not urge a restrictive
approach to the Rule, but argues for a flexible interpretation. Further, this Comment
encourages Ohio not to restrict application of the Rule to artificial conditions.
62
The drafters formulated the Rule with the intent that it be strictly applied.6 3
Therefore, in order to establish liability under the Rule all five of the elements of
section 339 must be satisfied. 6' This strict requirement is a guarantee that the interests
of both the landowner and the child will be examined in each case. Superficially, the
Rule appears inflexible, since every one of its elements must be fulfilled before
57. Prosser, supra note 38.
58. See REs ATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 339(d).
59. Id. § 339(e).
60. Strang v. New Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45, 86 A.2d 777, 780 (1951).
61. For an examination of the different applications of the Restatement Rule see 62 AM. Jug. 2d §§ 146-68 (1972 &
Supp. 1984).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
63. Martinelli v. Peters, 413 Pa. 472, 198 A.2d 530 (1964).
64. Taylor v. Alaska Rivers Navigation Co., 391 P.2d 15 (Alaska 1964); Fourseam Corp. v. Greer, 282 S.W.2d 129
(Ky. 1955); Hocking v. Duluth, Missabe & Iron Range Ry., 263 Minn. 483, 117 N.W.2d 304 (1962); Martinelli v.
Peters, 413 Pa. 472, 198 A.2d 530 (1964).
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liability can be imposed. Nevertheless, the Rule is flexible, since each of the ele-
ments can be applied flexibly. This flexibility is illustrated by the varied in-
terpretations accorded to each of the five elements of the Rule by the jurisdictions that
have adopted it.
65
In addition to the varied interpretations accorded each element of the Rule,
jurisdictions differ whether the fulfillment of each of the five conditions should be
decided as a matter of law or a question of fact. Several jurisdictions hold that
whether the special Rule applies is a question of law. 66 The prevalent view, however,
is whether the conditions of the Restatement Rule have been met is a question of fact
for the jury. 67
This Comment suggests that the latter view is more appropriate and should be
adopted by Ohio. The flexibility of the Rule depends upon a careful factual analysis
by the fact finder in each case. Were the court to apply it solely as a question of law,
the overall utility of the Restatement Rule could be diminished severely. While a jury
given broad discretion might tend to sympathize with and therefore find in favor of
child plaintiffs, a safeguard is available to a defendant that would be unavailable if
the applicability of the Restatement Rule were decided as a matter of law by the
court-defense counsel could submit jury interrogatories. By submitting interrogato-
ries, counsel would be able to ascertain whether all five elements have been met.
Should the answers to those interrogatories indicate that all five conditions have not
been satisfied, the court should set aside the verdict as a matter of law. 68 This same
safeguard would not exist if courts were free to apply the Rule solely as a matter of
law. This is not meant to imply that judges will not attempt to separate the factual
findings from the issues at law. Nonetheless, human nature and human frailties do
suggest that the division between judge and jury would be more efficient and appro-
priate. The following discussion will highlight the components of the Restatement
Rule.
1. Age of the Child
The Second Restatement modified the original version of section 339 by replac-
ing the words "young children trespassing" with the more flexible "children
trespassing." 69 Thus, while early cases rarely applied the attractive nuisance doctrine
to children over the age of twelve, 70 the standard under the Second Restatement
appears to be less rigid and would allow recovery even in the case of a considerably
older child, if the danger is one that a child of similar age would not be expected to
appreciate. 7 1 This change takes into account the increasingly complex technological
nature of modem society. For example, a condition may be so complex and latently
65. See infra text accompanying notes 72-98; see also supra note 61.
66. See, e.g., Bloodworth v. Stuart, 221 Tenn. 567, 428 S.W.2d 786 (1968); Massie v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 319,
233 S.W.2d 449 (1950).
67. See, e.g., MacNeil v. Perkins, 84 Ariz. 74, 324 P.2d 211 (1958); Nechodomu v. Lindstrom, 273 Wis. 313, 77
N.W.2d 707 (1956).
68. Onto R. Ctv. P. 49(b).
69. REsTATEMENT (SEcotD) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
70. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note I, § 59.
71. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339 comment c (1965).
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dangerous that even a child of sixteen would not appreciate its danger. Conversely, a
condition may be so common and obviously dangerous that even a very young child
would be able to understand its inherent danger. The Restatement's drafters recog-
nized this when eliminating the word "young" from the language of the Rule. A
plaintiff's age is considered in view of the prevailing foreseeability requirement of the
Rule.
2. Knowledge of Children's Presence
The Second Restatement requires the possessor of land to know, or have reason
to know, that children likely will trespass on the place where the condition exists,
before liability will be imposed for an injury caused by the condition.7 2 The official
comments to the Restatement indicate that the drafters' intent behind this requirement
was to define "has reason to know" as having information that would lead a person
of reasonable intelligence, or of the superior intelligence of the possessor, to infer
that children are trespassing, or to govern her conduct upon the assumption that they
are doing SO. 7 3 To impose liability on the possessor
it is not enough that the possessor "should know" of trespasses, in the sense that a
reasonable man in his position would investigate to discover the fact. The possessor is
under no duty to make any investigation or inquiry as to whether children are trespassing,
or are likely to trespass, until he is notified or otherwise receives information which would
lead a reasonable man to that conclusion.
74
Accordingly, the Restatement Rule does not require that landowners guard their
property as fortresses as some of the jurisdictions that had rejected the attractive
nuisance doctrine had feared. 75 The duty to investigate arises only when the landown-
er has actual or constructive knowledge of the child's presence.
3. Dangerousness of the Condition
The second precondition to liability under the Restatement Rule is that the
possessor know or have reason to know of the condition, and realize or should realize
that an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to the trespassing children is
created by the condition. 76 The same definition of "has reason to know" applies both
to the possessor's knowledge or reason to know the condition exists upon his land,
and to the likelihood of its causing danger to trespassing children.77 The possessor is
under no duty to inspect or police his land to discover whether such conditions exist.
Rather, he becomes liable only when he knows or has reason to know that such
dangerous conditions do indeed exist.
78
The drafters of the Restatement noted that to impose a higher standard would
unduly burden landowners. In light of the drafters' desire to balance the interests of
72. Id. § 339(a).
73. Id. § 339 comment g.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tower, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (1901).
76. REsTATmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339(b) (1965).
77. Id. § 339 comment h.
78. Id.
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both landowner and child the fear that the Restatement Rule will unduly burden
landowners by forcing them to become absolute insurers of the safety of trespassing
children7 9 is without merit. Landowners under the Restatement Rule will not be
unduly burdened, since the Rule does not impose any duty to police one's land. 80
Rather, the Rule requires only that landowners take responsibility for those con-
ditions of which the reasonable person in the landowner's situation would know.
Thus, what some jurisdictions have rejected as unreasonably burdensome is simply a
rule that proscribes ordinary negligence.
4. The Child's Knowledge of the Danger
The third element of the Restatement Rule states that the Rule applies only if the
children entering upon the land, because of their youth, do not discover the condition
nor realize the risk of danger of either meddling with it or coming into the area made
dangerous by it. 8' The third element of the Rule is similar to the type of assumption
of risk in which a plaintiff is aware of a risk that has been created by the negligence of
the defendant, yet chooses voluntarily to encounter it. 82 It is this type of assumption
of risk that most closely resembles contributory negligence. 83 The Supreme Court of
Ohio in Anderson v. Ceccardi84 recently held that the doctrines of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk have been merged under Ohio's comparative
negligence statute. 85 Therefore, most forms of assumption of risk that had acted as a
complete bar to recovery prior to Anderson, will no longer act as a bar.8 6
The Anderson decision raises an interesting question regarding the third element
of the Restatement Rule: to what extent does an injured child have to satisfy that
element in order for the Rule to apply? Two opposing positions can be taken. The
first position is since Anderson makes clear assumption of risk will no longer act as an
automatic bar to recovery-as long as the defendant's negligence was at least a
fifty-one percent cause of the plaintiffs injury 87 -it should not act as a bar to
recovery for child plaintiffs under the Restatement Rule. Rather, the court should
weigh the child's own "contribution" to his injuries against the negligence of the
79. This fear was one of the original reasons for rejection of the attractive nuisance doctrine by Ohio and some other
jurisdictions. See Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907); see, e.g., Ryan v. Tower, 128 Mich. 463,
87 N.W. 644 (1901).
80. Simmel v. New Jersey Coop. Co., 28 N.J. 1, 143 A.2d 521 (1958).
81. R STATFmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339(c) (1965).
82. W. PROSSER & W. KEMON, supra note 1, § 68.
83. Id.
84. 6 Ohio St. 3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780 (1983).
85. Id. at 113, 451 N.E.2d at 783; see Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1982).
86. For a detailed analysis of the current state of the assumption of risk doctrine in Ohio following the decision in
Anderson v. Ceccardi, see Note, Assumption of Risk Merged with Contributory Negligence, 45 Onto ST. L.J. 1059
(1985).
87. Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page Supp. 1982).That section states in pertinent part:
(A)(1) In negligence actions, the contributory negligence of a person does not bar the person or his legal
representative from recovering damages that have directly and proximately resulted from the negligence of one
or more other persons, if the contributory negligence of the person bringing the action was no greater than the
combined negligence ofall other persons from whom recovery is sought. However, any damages recoverable by
the person bringing the action shall be diminished by an amount that is proportionately equal to his percentage of
negligence....
Id. (emphasis added).
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landowner. Therefore, the first position leads to the conclusion that, as a matter of
law, the third element would be satisfied so long as the trier of fact finds that the
child's assumption of the risk was a lesser cause of his injuries than was the negli-
gence of the landowner.
The second and opposing position is based on a more technical argument.
According to this argument, the third element of the Restatement Rule, although
sounding much like assumption of risk, is not to be equated with that doctrine
because it is an affirmative element of the child plaintiff's cause of action under the
Rule, and is not a defense. Under this view, since the requirement operates as an
element of the cause of action, the requirement must be completely satisfied before
recovery can occur. This position does not violate Anderson v. Ceccardi since An-
derson relates only to assumption of risk as a defense.
The first position would lead to more recoveries for plaintiffs than the second
position, since the first position permits recovery even when the plaintiff bears
forty-nine percent of the fault for his injury. Still, although these two positions are
inconsistent with each other, they both are analytically correct. The precise applica-
tion of this element of the Restatement Rule is a matter of policy and since the Rule is
only a model approach, it may be interpreted and applied in the manner that is most
appropriate for Ohio. Neither interpretation would be totally inconsistent with
approaches utilized in the other jurisdictions that have adopted and applied the
Restatement Rule. 8
This element, regardless of the specific manner in which it is applied, operates
as an important limitation on a landowner's liability under the Rule. 89 This limitation
should alleviate the concern of those who feel that the ability to make free use of
one's land is severely restricted by the Restatement Rule. The landowner's duty
under the Rule is to exercise reasonable care to keep the part of the land upon which
the landowner should realize the likelihood of children's trespassing free from those
conditions that, though observable by adults, are not likely to be observed by chil-
dren, or that contain risks which are beyond the imperfect understanding of
children. 90 Again, it must be noted that the term "children" is defined loosely under
the Rule. 9 ' The trier of fact should look at whether the risk likely would have been
perceived by a child of the same age and mentality as that of the trespasser. This
analysis should turn on the type of condition that is maintained and the obviousness of
the danger it presents.
5. Utility of the Condition
The fourth condition which must exist in order to impose liability under the Rule
is that the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of
88. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
89. The view that landowners should be able to make free use of their own land was one of the primary reasons for
rejection of the doctrine in Ohio. Hannon v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921); Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77
Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 comment i (1965).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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eliminating the danger must be slight compared to the risk to the children involved.9
This is a balancing test that, if applied in accordance with the comments to section
339, will tend to limit rather than extend liability. Comment n states that the public
interest in the possessors' free use of the land for their own purposes is of great
significance. 93 A particular condition, therefore, is regarded as not involving an
unreasonable risk to trespassing children unless it involves a grave risk that could be
avoided without any serious interference with the possessor's legitimate use of the
land. The standard is reasonableness in the use of one's land in light of the type of
condition, the value of the condition, and the cost to make it safe. 94 It is a balancing
of costs and benefits test, similar to the famous test adopted by Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 95
The requirement that the burden of eliminating the condition be slight weighs
favorably toward applying the Restatemei.t Rule to all conditions, natural and artifi-
cial. If a useful natural condition would be very burdensome to eliminate as compared
with the risk of harm to children it may pose, the Restatement Rule would not impose
any duty on the landowner. This requirement prevents landowners from becoming
absolute insurers of children's safety. The Rule thus imposes only a slight burden on
landowners' use of their land, while affording protection to children from dangerous
conditions. This result is especially desirable in view of the high value society places
on the safety of children.
6. The Exercise of Reasonable Care by the Possessor
The final precondition for liability under the Rule is that the possessor must have
failed to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger (defined in subsections (b)
and (c)) or otherwise must have failed to reasonably protect the trespassing
children. 96 Thus, even though the possessor knows that children are likely to tres-
pass, that the condition on the land involves an unreasonable risk of harm to them,
and that they are neither likely to discover nor appreciate the risk, no liability will be
imposed unless the possessor has failed to take steps that a reasonable person would
take under similar circumstances. 97 This requirement does not impose a duty upon the
possessor to make the premises "childproof." Indeed, in many instances the reason-
able care requirement can be satisfied by merely warning the child of the danger,
provided the warning can reasonably be expected to be appreciated and followed by
the child. Therefore, one of the traditional criticisms of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine, that it would amount practically to insurance of all children by landowners, 98 is
without merit under the Restatement Rule, if the Rule is applied as intended by its
drafters.
92. Id. § 339(d).
93. Id. § 339 comment n.
94. Id.
95. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The Hand test was formulated in the context of determining whether a defendant's
conduct posed an unreasonable risk of harm. The test states that an unreasonable risk of harm has occurred if B is less than
the product of L times P (B < L x P), where B is the burden which the defendant would have had to bear to avoid the risk,
L is the gravity of the potential injury, and P is the probability that harm will occur from the defendant's conduct.
96. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339(e) (1965).
97. Id. § 339 comment o.
98. Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 A. 858 (1911).
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As a close analysis of its requirements demonstrates, the Restatement Rule
balances the interests of the child trespasser and the landowner. Because all five
conditions need to be satisfied for the possessor to be liable, the Rule provides an
adequate opportunity for the trier of fact to analyze carefully all of the attendant
circumstances of each case, rather than simply categorize the condition involved as
being an attractive nuisance vel non. The result of the Rule is the imposition of
ordinary negligence liability based on foreseeability and reasonable care.
IV. REJECTION OF THE RULE: A SHRINKING MINORITY
Although the Restatement Rule has gained widespread adoption, Ohio has de-
cided not to take a modem approach to the attractive nuisance problem. In failing to
adopt a version of the attractive nuisance doctrine, 99 Ohio remains one of only three
jurisdictions that have neither created a special duty towards trespassing children in
the form of the attractive nuisance doctrine or the Restatement Rule, 100 nor adopted
the Rowland v. Christian1 1 approach by abrogating the distinctions of duty based on
status as either a trespasser, licensee, or invitee. The jurisdictions following the
Rowland approach have replaced those distinctions with a standard of reasonable care
under the circumstances. 10
2
In the three jurisdictions that still reject some form of greater protection for
trespassing minors,' 0 3 a number of justifications for rejection have been given, none
of which are compelling today. These justifications include: (1) the attractive nui-
sance doctrine has its foundation on sympathy rather than on any sound principle of
law;' °4 (2) the doctrine impairs property rights; 10 5 (3) the doctrine imposes on every
member of the community a higher duty for the protection of children than is imposed
99. The doctrine has been flatly rejected in Ohio. Hannon v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921);
Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907); Swarts v. Akron Water Works Co., 77 Ohio St. 235, 83
N.E. 66 (1907). It should be noted that these decisions rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine that was based on
allurement or implied invitation and not the Restatement Rule. In fact, all were decided prior to the promulgation of the
Restatement of Torts in 1934.
100. Other than Ohio, only Vermont, Hillier v. Noble, 142 Vt. 552, 458 A.2d 1101 (1983); and Maryland, Murphy
v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 290 Md. 186, 428 A.2d 459 (1981), have retained the traditional distinctions between
trespassers, licensees, and invitecs without providing for a special duty of care towards trespassing children, injured as a
result of highly dangerous artificial conditions present on the land.
101. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
102. This Rowland rationale has been adopted by the following jurisdictions: Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc.,
469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Webb v. City of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich,
175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Cates v.
Beauregard Elec. Coop., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976); Basso
v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868,386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127
(R.I. 1975).
Several other states have repudiated the licensee-invitee distinction but have retained more limited duty rules for
trespassers. Poulin v. Colby Cols.ge, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43
(1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977);
Antoniewicz v. Reszcynaski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
Even though Massachusetts did not eliminate the category of trespasser in adopting Rowland, the Massachusetts
legislature passed a nearly verbatim version of the Restatement Rule in 1977. See infra note 113.
103. See supra note 100.
104. Bottum's Adm'r. v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 A. 858 (1911).
105. Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
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on their parents; 10 6 and (4) if the doctrine is carried to its logical conclusion, it would
be tantamount to insurance of all children.
10 7
These so-called justifications, viewed in light of modem society's values favor-
ing the protection of children10 8 and the intent of the Restatement Rule, are no longer
valid. They were espoused many years prior to the Restatement's promulgation.
Indeed, the rejection of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Ohio came at a time when
the doctrine was based on an allurement theory.10 9 Nonetheless, a few jurisdictions,
including Ohio, have not re-examined the law since the issuance of the Restatement
of Torts.110 Even if Ohio's rejection at that time were proper, it does not remain
proper today. The Restatement Rule differs significantly from the old, and widely
rejected, theory based on an allurement or an implied invitation. "1 I
Several jurisdictions that, along with Ohio, had rejected the attractive nuisance
doctrine have reexamined their law, and have adopted the Restatement Rule.
112
Massachusetts, a jurisdiction that, until as late as 1977, had purported to reject the
attractive nuisance doctrine, took a major step forward when it statutorily enacted a
nearly verbatim version of the Restatement Rule as the new law in that state."
13
Maine, a jurisdiction that, until 1972, espoused the view that trespassing chil-
dren were to be afforded no greater protection than that afforded trespassing
adults," 4 joined the vast majority of jurisdictions and adopted the Restatement Rule
in Jones v. Billings.115 In Jones a three year old child fell into a cesspool that
negligently had been left open and unprotected on the defendant's property. The child
subsequently died as a result of the fall. 1 6 In what the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine characterized as a "radical departure from our prior case law," 117 the court
explained in great detail the merits of the Restatement Rule. The court stated that the
Restatement Rule was carefully drafted to limit the duty owed to trespassing children
by the possessor of property to specific and well defined situations. Furthermore, the
Restatement Rule does not impose an obligation "to exercise ordinary care to keep
106. Hannon v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921).
107. See Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 A. 858 (1911).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 182-83.
109. Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907) was decided when the allurement version of the
attractive nuisance doctrine based on Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875) was widely accepted.
110. See supra note 100.
I 11. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
112. It is especially interesting to note that two jurisdictions which until very recently had rejected the attractive
nuisance doctrine have opted to take the more liberal Rowland approach of eliminating the traditional distinctions based on
status and replacing them with the standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. See supra notes 20 & 102.
Rhode Island, which adopted the Second Restatement § 339 in Haddad v. First Nat'l. Stores, Inc., 109 R.I. 59, 280
A.2d 93 (1971) after having rejected the doctrine for many years, later adopted the Rowland view and abolished the
traditional distinctions. Although the two views would appear to be inconsistent with each other, the court nonetheless
held the two to be harmonious in Bemhart v. Nine, 120 R.I. 692, 700, 391 A.2d 75, 79 (1978).
Another state that has long rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine, New Hampshire, abandoned its harsh view
towards trespassing children and adopted the Rowland approach in Ouelette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 557, 364 A.2d
631, 634 (1976).
113. The Massachusetts statute, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 231 § 85Q (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983), is discussed
in Soule v. Mass. Elec. Co., 378 Mass. 177, 390 N.E.2d 716 (1979). The court termed the statutory enactment a
softening of a "Draconian doctrine," Id. at 180, 390 N.E.2d at 718.
114. Cogswell v. Warren Bros. Road Co., 229 A.2d 215 (Me. 1967).
115. Jones v. Billings, 289 A.2d 39, 43 (Me. 1972).
116. Id. at 40.
117. Id. at 43.
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the premises reasonably safe" since it applies only to conditions "which involve an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm.""
8
In Jones the Maine court explained the reason for its former reluctance to adopt
the Rule. In large part the court had refused to adopt the Rule because many ju-
risdictions had been applying it loosely, without requiring clear proof of all five of the
Restatement's requirements. The court felt that this misapplication of the Rule had
resulted in some cases of imposing on defendants a duty of being absolute insurers of
the safety of trespassing children and a duty to "childproof" the premises. 19 This
"insurance" rationale had been one of the traditional reasons for rejecting the doc-
trine in the past, even among jurisdictions that have since accepted the Restatement
Rule. 20 The Jones court noted, however, that this result was not contemplated by the
Restatement Rule itself. Indeed, the court stated:
[W]e have become satisfied from a reading of the cases that when courts have vigilantly
respected the limits of liability contemplated by the Rule and clearly stated therein, the
burden imposed upon the possessor of property has not been intolerable or unjust. When
the Rule is properly understood and applied, liability will attach only with respect to
conditions involving an "unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm" and not to
those innocuous conditions which are normally considered perfectly safe but which the
ingenuity of the childish mind can sometimes convert to an instrument of harm.' 21
Rhode Island is another jurisdiction that, after years of rejecting the attractive
nuisance doctrine,' 2 2 has recently adopted the Restatement Rule. In Haddad v. First
National Stores, Inc., 123 plaintiff, a five year old child, was injured when she fell
from a shopping cart which was being pushed by another child in defendant super-
market's parking lot after business hours. Several carts had been left in the parking lot
after the store's closing.'2 4 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, after a careful
examination of the development of the attractive nuisance doctrine and of the current
state of the doctrine, overruled prior case law and adopted the Restatement Rule. 125
In adopting the Restatement's version of the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court
emphasized that in order to apply the Rule properly all five elements of the Rule must
first be met. 126
The court rejected the outdated "allurement theory," and succinctly stated the
compelling reasons for following the Restatement Rule. Speaking for the court,
Justice Kelleher wrote:
A young child cannot, because of his immaturity and lack of judgment, be deemed to be
able to perceive all the dangers he might encounter as he trespasses on the land of others.
There must and should be an accomodation between the landowner's unrestricted right to
118. Id. at 42.
119. Id.
120. W. PROSSER & W. KEEToN, supra note 1. § 59.
121. Jones v. Billings, 289 A.2d 39, 43 (Me. 1972).
122. See. e.g., Houle v. Carr-Consolidated Biscuit Co., 85 R.I. 1. 125 A.2d 143 (1956), overruled by Haddad v.
First Nat'l Stores, Inc.. 109 R.I. 59, 280 A.2d 93 (1971).
123. Haddad v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 109 R.I. 59, 280 A.2d 93 (1971).
124. Id. at 60-61, 280 A.2d at 94-95.
125. Id. at 64, 280 A.2d at 96.
126. Id.
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use of his land and society's interest in the protection of the life and limb of its young.
When these respective social-economic interests are placed on the scale, the public's
concern for a youth's safety far outweighs the owner's desire to utilize the land as he sees
fit. . . . The Restatement [Riule is a reasonable compromise between the conflicting
interests. 
2 7
The court also stated that by adopting the Restatement Rule, possessors of land
would not become insurers of the safety of young trespassers. 128 The strict require-
ments of the Restatement Rule prevent this overapplication of the doctrine to situa-
tions which do not meet each of the Rule's five criteria. It is only when all five
criteria have been met that liability can be imposed. 129
V. OHIO'S FAILURE TO ADOPT THE DOCTRINE
Although several jurisdictions have reexamined their prior stance on the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine,' 30 Ohio has consistently failed to reexamine its own position
on the doctrine. Instead, the Ohio courts have continued to rely on the seventy-five
year old case of Railroad Co. v. Harvey' 31 in stating that the attractive nuisance
doctrine does not apply in Ohio. In Harvey the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "[it
is not the duty of an occupier of land to exercise care to make it safe for infant
children who come upon it without invitation but merely by sufferance. . . . The
doctrine of the turntable cases is disapproved."' 132 Although the Supreme Court of
Ohio has heard other cases involving attractive nuisance issues, it has summarily
dismissed those cases by simply citing Harvey. 133 The more recent Ohio decisions
have not even questioned the basis of the Harvey decision. 134 Instead, that decision
has been blindly followed for nearly three quarters of a century.
Because the courts in Ohio have relied so heavily on the Harvey decision, an
analysis of that case is necessary. Harvey was the classic "turntable" case in which a
child trespasser was injured while playing on an unlocked railroad turntable. 135 The
case was brought as a typical "allurement" or "implied invitation' 36 cause of
action, the rationale of which has since been rejected by the Restatement Rule. 137
The court in its lengthy opinion canvassed many jurisdictions regarding the
applicability of the attractive nuisance doctrine as it existed in 1907.138 Though the
127. Id. (citation omitted).
128. Id.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 339 (1965). The Restatement Rule is quite explicit in stating that all five
elements must exist before any liability can be imposed under the section. This is apparent from the Rule's use of the word
"and" preceeding clauses (b), (c), (d), and (e). See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
130. See supra notes 112-13, 115 & 123 and accompanying text.
131. 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
132. Id. at syllabus, paras. 1-2.
133. See, e.g., Morgenstern v. Austin, 170 Ohio St. 113, 115, 162 N.E.2d 849, 851 (1959); Sharp Realty Co. v.
Forsha, 122 Ohio St. 368, 371, 171 N.E. 598, 600 (1930).
134. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Fairmont Food Co., 305 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Steven v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co.,
26 Ohio Op. 2d 345, 346, 193 N.E.2d 317, 318 (C.P. Pickaway Cty. 1960) (citing Harvey with approval but deciding the
case as an exception to that rule).
135. Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 236-37, 83 N.E. 66, 67 (1907).
136. See supra note 16.
137. See supra text accompanying note 34.
138. Railroad Co. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 243-45, 83 N.E. 66, 69-70 (1907).
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court cited cases as standing for the attractive nuisance doctrine, these cases actually
were decided on the implied invitation theory,' 39 and as a result were later repudiated
by most of those jurisdictions that had previously accepted the implied invitation
theory,"' choosing in its stead the position of the Restatement Rule. The Harvey
decision was a clear rejection of the allurement or implied invitation theory, but not
necessarily a rejection of the modem Restatement Rule as well. The Harvey court
wrote, "[t]he real reason for implying invitation, or declaring a turntable to be a lure,
is to escape the imputation of making the law, rather than declaring it."4'
The Harvey court rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine in Ohio based upon
the following beliefs: 1) the doctrine would impair property rights, 2) the doctrine
would charge the duty of protection of children upon every member of a community
except their parents, and 3) the doctrine had no true legal basis."' 2 It is clear from a
careful reading of the opinion that in 1907 the Supreme Court of Ohio placed a
greater value on the free use of land than it did on the protection of society's youth.
The court also hinted in dictum, that it wanted to leave the issue of adoption of the
doctrine to the legislature, rather than to judicially create a duty. ' 43
In support of the proposition that a child trespasser is owed no duty greater than
that owed an adult trespasser, the court cited many cases from other jurisdictions
which have since been overruled either judicially" or statutorily. 145 Even though
there has been a general reversal in the law relied upon by the Harvey court to reach
its decision, Ohio courts still view Harvey as the controlling authority on the issue. 146
In a companion case to Harvey, the court in Swarts v. Akron Water Works
Co. 147 was confronted with a case in which the attractive nuisance doctrine arguably
applied to a non-turntable case. The court flatly rejected this application 148 and held
that abrogating the general rule of nonliability to trespassers in the case 6f child
trespassers would force every owner of property to make his premises childproof. 149
The court even stated that the logical extension of this exception of nonliability would
extend the doctrine to apply to purely natural conditions.' 50
The Harvey and Swarts decisions were followed in several later cases. 151 The
opinions in those later cases fail, however, to explain the basis for this continued
reliance. Indeed, the rationale of Harvey has rarely been questioned. Although the
Harvey decision was severely criticized by one justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio
139. See supra text accompanying notes 16-30.
140. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
141. Railroad Co. v. Harvey. 77 Ohio St. 235. 255. 83 N.E. 66. 72 (1907) (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 250. 83 N.E. at 70.
143. Id. at 255-56. 83 N.E. at 72. Although the Ohio General Assembly could adopt the Restatement Rule
statutorily, as did Massachusetts. see supra note 113, it would be more effective to adopt the Rule judicially. In that way.
the Restatement Rule's flexibility would be better maintained.
144. See supra notes 46, 115 & 123.
145. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
146. Hannon v. Ehrlich. 102 Ohio St. 176. 131 N.E. 504 (1921); Cleveland v. Parschen. 9 Ohio L. Abs. 694 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1931): Minick v. Windsor Brick Co.. 30 Ohio App. 232. 164 N.E. 769 (1929).
147. 77 Ohio St. 235. 262. 83 N.E. 66. 74 (19071.
148. Id. at 269. 83 N.E. at 76.
149. Id. at 264. 83 N.E. at 75.
150. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 58-60 for an explanation of why an extention of the Rule to natural
conditions is perfectly logical.
151. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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a few years after it was decided,' 52 it is well settled today that the attractive nuisance
doctrine, rejected in Harvey, has no application in Ohio.153
In Hannon v. Ehrlich,154 decided 14 years after Harvey, the Supreme Court of
Ohio rejected once again the theory that trespassing children should be afforded a
greater duty of care than that afforded trespassing adults.155 Hannon involved the
death of an eight year old child who was killed while playing in defendant's sand
pit. 156 Although the court was not entirely clear whether the boy was a trespasser or a
licensee, it proceeded to hold that no greater duty existed towards the boy because of
his youth. 15
7
The Hannon court quoted extensively from Harvey and further explained the
basis for the rejection of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Ohio:
Any other rule than [rejection of the attractive nuisance doctrine] would impose a much
greater burden and a higher duty for the protection of children upon every member of the
community than is imposed upon the child's parents.... The contrary rule as stated in
many cases produced the effect of making persons owning dangerous premises insurers of
the lives and limbs of the children of the neighborhood.
158
In Signs v. Signs 159 the Supreme Court of Ohio appeared to be critical of the
decisions in Harvey and Hannon but failed, nonetheless, to overrule them. Signs
involved an injury to a six year old who was burned while playing with a gasoline
pump on the defendant's property. 160 The court denied recovery based upon the prior
Harvey and Hannon decisions, stating that the "infancy of the child is not a factor,
under the decisions of [the Supreme Court of Ohio], in conferring upon the child any
greater rights than those of a trespasser." 161 Although it followed the rule established
by Harvey and Hannon, the Signs court implied that it was not entirely comfortable
with Harvey and its progeny. The court noted, however, that it was not within the
152. In Ziehm v. Vale, 98 Ohio St. 306, 120 N.E. 702 (1918) (Wanamaker, J., concuring) decided eleven years
after Harvey, Justice Wanamaker, in a harsh concurrence stated:
I desire here and now to register my protest against the judgment of [Railroad Co. v. Harvey]. It was an
astonisher to the profession and the public at the time it was rendered, in 1907, and indicates the high-water
mark of the supreme court of that time in its effort to magnify property right and minimize personal right---the
right to life, limb, health and safety-especially when applied to a child four and a half years of age.
The [Harvey] opinion notes more than a hundred cases pro and con, and reviews many of them touching the
subject-matter of that case....
The [Slupreme [Clourt of the United States in Sioux City & Pac. Rd. Co. v. Stout, [citation omitted] laid
down the doctrine that entitled Harvey to a verdict in that case.
The opinion in the Harvey [case] laments the fact that "[Tihe multitude of circumstances under which the
owner of property would be liable for injuries to children, and the very serious burden that was, in consequence,
being placed upon the owners of property, were very probably not foreseen in the [Stout] case."
Throughout the [Harvey] opinion much consideration is given to the conservation of property, but sub-
stantially no regard to the conservation of child life, limb and safety. Many cases no doubt sustain the Harvey
[case], but an equal number of cases may be found in the books sustaining witchcraft, slavery, and other
inhumanities and infamies, in the light of present-day civilization and jurisprudence.
Id. at 314-15, 120 N.E. at 704.
153. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
154. 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921).
155. Id. at 184, 131 N.E. at 507.
156. Id. at 177, 131 N.E. at 505.
157. Id. at 185-86, 131 N.E. at 507.
158. Id. at 187, 131 N.E. at 508.
159. 161 Ohio St. 241, 118 N.E.2d 411 (1954).
160. Id. at 242, 118 N.E.2d at 411.
161. Id. at 243, 118 N.E.2d at 412.
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court's province to create any special duty: "Although the law, as long established in
this state by [Harvey and Hannon], may seem to be harsh, there has been no legisla-
tive change therein." 162 Why the court preferred to let the legislature change the law
is not entirely clear. Simply altering a judicially created law is well within the
province of the very courts which created those laws. 1
63
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio has consistently refused to apply the
attractive nuisance doctrine in Ohio,' 64 there are certain situations in which the court
has held that a greater degree of care is owed to trespassing children. 165 In regard to
liability for injuries to children, the view has been taken that there is a material
difference between trespassing upon private premises and using private property left
unguarded or unlocked in a public place. 166 The rationale given for this distinction is
that "while the presence of children on private property cannot always be reason-
ably anticipated, their presence upon public streets and alleys is to be invariably
expected .... " 167
Dean Prosser stated that the public-private distinction is based on the naive
ground that the child injured while climbing on a chattel left in the street is then
"where he has a right to be." In fact, however, the child "has no more right to be
upon the truck, the power line pole, or the lumber pile than upon [one's] land.' 168
Prosser concluded by characterizing the public-private distinction as a "half-hearted
acceptance of the [attractive nuisance] principle, which may in time lead to full
recognition." 1 69 From Prosser's astute observation it is clear that there is no material
difference between a dangerous private and a dangerous public condition. Applying a
special duty in one situation and not in the other is unjustifiable. The duty afforded in
cases of injury on public land caused by private chattels should likewise extend to
those situations covered by the Restatement Rule on private land.
170
Another exception to the general rule established in Ohio by Harvey and Hannon
is that "[o]ne who keeps or uses explosives owes a duty to young children, who may
have access to or come in contact with them and who cannot be expected to know and
appreciate the danger incident thereto, to exercise care commensurate with the danger
in order to avoid injury to such children.' 7 1 The Restatement position on artificial
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. The classic denunciation of the attractive nuisance doctrine had been voiced in Ryan v. Tower, 128 Mich. 463,
87 N.W. 644 (1901), a case heavily relied on by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Harvey. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
of Michigan, later seeing the Restatement Rule's merits, adopted the Rule as the law in that state. See Lyshak v. City of
Detroit, 351 Mich. 230, 249, 88 N.W.2d 596, 606 (1958).
164. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 166 & 171 and accompanying text.
166. Klingensmith v. Scioto Valley Traction Co., 18 Ohio App. 290 (1924).
167. Collins v. Sutter, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 27, 29 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934).
168. W. PRossER & W. KEETON, supra note 1, § 59.
169. Id.
170. This conclusion was also reached by Dean Prosser in his article concerning trespassing children. Prosser, supra
note 38.
171. Vaughan v. Industrial Silica Corp., 140 Ohio St. 17, 17, 42 N.E.2d 156, 156 (1942); see Harriman v.
Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387, 24 N.E. 658 (1890); see alsoDiGildov. Caponi, 18 Ohio St.
2d 125, 247 N.E.2d 732 (1969), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that "[t]he amount of care required to
discharge a duty owing to a child of tender years exposed to danger is necessarily greater than that required to discharge a
duty to an adult exposed to the same danger." Id. at syllabus, para. I. The DiGildo decision cannot be said to have created
a special duty towards child trespassers, as it only dealt with a child social guest. Nonetheless, it is a clear indication of the
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conditions that are highly dangerous to trespassing children,' 72 although clearly not
limited to explosives, is basically the same. Why the court has chosen to single out
explosives as opposed to all highly dangerous instrumentalities is not clear and indeed
is not justifiable. Adopting the Restatement Rule would simply and logically extend
the explosives rationale to all dangerous conditions which are sufficiently dangerous
to meet the second of the Rule's requirements. Additionally, the Rule would take into
account the value of maintaining such a condition.
As a practical matter, Ohio attorneys faced with the case of the injured child
under circumstances that would be encompassed by the Restatement Rule, have had
to base their case on a violation of the duty of care to any trespasser. Thus, attorneys
have tried often to characterize a particular condition as a trap or a hidden danger. ' 73
The obvious problem with this approach is that it is only in extreme cases that the
facts will warrant a finding that the owner or occupant intended to injure the child, or
that he expected a trespass and set a trap for the trespasser.
1 74
VI. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT SECTION 339 IN OHIO
The Ohio courts' uncritical reliance on the rule of law espoused in Harvey and
Hannon175 has had an important ramification-the courts have never evaluated the
modern attractive nuisance doctrine as it has been set forth in the Restatement Rule' 76
and widely adopted by other jurisdictions. 177 In fact, no reported decision of the
Supreme Court of Ohio or the Ohio Courts of Appeals has ever made any mention of
Supreme Court of Ohio's recognition of the societal value of protecting children from dangerous conditions of which those
children may be unaware, at least under certain circumstances.
172. RESTATF.IENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
173. See. e.g., Brockmeyer v. Deuer, No. 81AP-537, at 3727 (Franklin Cty., Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 19. 1981): In
Brockmeyer, the plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against defendants to recover damages for the death of their eight
year old son who drowned in an unused swimming pool located on defendants' property. The child, at the very most. was
a licensee at the time of his death.
Both parties agreed that the attractive nuisance doctrine did not apply in Ohio. The plaintiffs, however, alleged in
their complaint that "said pool being unfenced. half-filled and slime covered, in effect, amounted to a trap, defendant
having knowledge, or being charged with knowledge that said property was frequented by adults and children." Id. at
3727-28.
The court sustained the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. It held that "Itlhe condition
of the swimming pool and its potential perils were open and obvious and, as a matter of law, [fell] short of being hidden
perils or traps." Id. at 3729.
Further language in that opinion is especially indicative of the Ohio courts' continued reliance on Harrey and its
progeny, and particularly, of the courts' reluctance to award damages based on any theory of attractive nuisance.
"Such dangerous conditions as open excavations .... railroad turntables .... open elevator shafts . .. abandoned
automobiles with gasoline in their fuel tanks . . . and unguarded and unmarked holes . . . all have been held as a matter
of law to fall short of being hidden perils or traps." Id. at 3729-30 [citations omitted]. Cf. Euclid-I05th St. Properties
Co. v. Beckman, 36 Ohio L. Abs. 164, 42 N.E.2d 789 (Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. 1931) (skylight in a roof which had been
covered up with tar paper and gravel so as to look like the rest of the roof, held to have been a trap or hidden danger and
caused the property owner who had created or tolerated the situation to become liable to the licensee who had been injured
as the result of the situation).
174. See Cox v. Alabama Water Co.. 216 Ala. 35, 112 So. 352 (1927): see also United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt.
258 U.S. 268 (1921).
175. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
176. RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
177. See supra note 46.
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section 339 of the Second Restatement of Torts. 178 Whether the courts are unaware of
the existence of section 339 or whether they simply are rejecting it as inconsistent
with Harvey and Hannon remains a mystery.
Harvey and its early progeny 179 were clearly based on the "allurement" or
"implied invitation" theory of the attractive nuisance doctrine; the Restatement Rule
has rejected these theories. 180 The Ohio courts have failed to distinguish the new rule
from the old, and one can only infer that the courts in Ohio have equated the
Restatement Rule with the doctrine that was rejected in Harvey. The Supreme Court
of Ohio needs to reassess its earlier position and should adopt the Restatement Rule as
the law in Ohio.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much has evolved in the area of tort law since 1907, including the abandonment
of the "allurement" or "implied invitation" theory of the attractive nuisance
doctrine.' 8 1 In its place, the version espoused by the Restatement Rule has been
adopted by the vast majority of jurisdictions.' 82 Society also has become more com-
plex and threatening to children. Likewise, children often are less supervised today as
increasing numbers of households have two parents who work outside the home.
Thus, modem society requires that everyone exercise greater care for the protection
of children who might not realize the dangers they may encounter.
Ohio should adopt the Restatement Rule of the attractive nuisance doctrine. As
the Supreme Court of Rhode Island aptly stated when that court recently adopted the
Restatement Rule:
183
There must and should be an accommodation between the landowner's right to use of his
land and society's interest in the protection of the life and limb of its young. When these
respective social-economic interests are placed on the scale, the public's concern for a
178. Stevens v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 26 Ohio Op. 2d 345, 193 N.E.2d 317 (C.P. Pickaway Cty. 1960) is the only
reported decision in Ohio that has mentioned the Restatement of Torts section 339 or the Second Restatement of Torts
section 339. Stevens was a wrongful death action where plaintiff's decedent was an infant who died when he fell from a
pipeline maintained by the defendant on a public bridge. Thus, the Stevens case fit into the "private condition on public
roads" exception to the general rule of no special duty to trespassing children because the injury occurred on a public
bridge. In dicta, the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas did quote in its entirety the Second Restatement section
339. However, the court relied on existing precedent to reach its holding.
179. Hannon v. Ehrlich, 102 Ohio St. 176, 131 N.E. 504 (1921).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 16-34.
181. See supra note 16.
182. See supra note 46.
183. Rhode Island had been a jurisdiction that, along with Ohio, had long rejected the attractive nuisance doctrine in
any form. Rhode Island subsequently adopted the Restatement Rule in 1971. See Haddad v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 109
R.I. 59, 280 A.2d 93 (1971).
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youth's safety far outweighs the owner's desire to utilize his land as he sees fit .... The
Restatement [R]ule is a reasonable compromise between the conflicting interests.184
In light of the foregoing analysis and the desire of the Supreme Court of Ohio to
be in the forefront of modem tort law, the court should reevaluate the basis for its
failure to take affirmative steps in this area of the law. Adoption of the Restatement
Rule would be a long-awaited step in the right direction.
David A. Gurwin
184. Id. at 64, 280 A.2d at 96 (citing Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45, 86 A.2d 777, 780
(1951)).
